In a war where offensive operations are equally difficult on both sides, not losing is already winning in the next year and a half
From: Euromaiden Press BY MYKOLA BIELIESKOV
Source: Texty.org.ua
Article by: Mykola Bielieskov
Translated by: Christine Chraibi
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian summer 2023 offensive, which failed to yield the desired results despite the firm dedication of the Ukrainian Army, there has been virtually no public discussion about Ukraine’s future optimal strategy in the war against Russia.
As Sir Lawrence Freedman states in his book – Modern Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine: “The challenge for a strategy in the course of war is to balance ends and means, where both may change in the course of the war itself.”
This public conceptual vacuum poses a dangerous two-fold threat.
- the lack of a strategic vision jeopardizes two crucial consensuses: an internal Ukrainian consensus on the necessity of persevering in the fight to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position and the external consensus among Ukraine’s allies on the need to assist it in exercising its inherent right to self-defense.
- the absence of clarity and at least internal agreement on the triangle of “goals, resources, and means of achieving goals” creates a fertile environment for various Russian influence operations aimed at eroding the aforementioned consensuses.
Ukraine’s partners have also hinted at this deficiency in strategic vision. While not intended to be exhaustive, these reflections serve as an attempt to stimulate public discussion on this critical issue.
Ukraine’s future Grand National Strategy
This article outlines the key strategic aspects of the current confrontation, which are necessary to develop a comprehensive strategy. Among the key tasks that Ukraine’s future strategy should address are:
Voice of Ukraine 