Whichever candidate takes the White House in November, the Russian war on Ukraine will be a major challenge. To handle it successfully, we must realize that Moscow is fighting not just for Ukraine but to shift the balance of power in Europe and, through it, in the world, as Vladimir Putin elucidated in his “ultimatum” of December 2021. Thwarting that ambition is imperative for US national security, the future of Europe, and the survival of democratic regimes the world over.
NATO leaders gathered in Washington, D.C., this past July to celebrate the Alliance’s seventy-fifth birthday as the war in Ukraine approached its 900-day mark. The war has been a slow and bloody slog, with Russia pitting its massive military industry and human resources against significant, albeit intermittent, Western support for Ukraine. Bolstered by North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela, and with the tacit cooperation of several nonaligned countries, the Kremlin is attempting to grind Ukraine down and open the door to further aggression in Europe.
As Russia has peaked in terms of its military production, finances, human resources, and information warfare, its limited successes can be reversed if the West commits to victory and consistent, ample, and intentional support for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. A committed policy would put Russia on the back foot, possibly as early as 2025, forcing its elites to recognize the futility of the war. That, in turn, can bring about Russia’s strategic defeat and possibly the Putin regime transitioning to a more realistic administration by 2026/27.
Despite its aggressive stance, Russia also has clear weaknesses. While commentators called Russia’s military the second most powerful in the world before February 24, 2022, Russia has suffered several military defeats over the centuries and truly is not “nine feet tall.” This report aims to identify exploitable vulnerabilities in the current conflict. To achieve this, we briefly analyze the historical precedents of Russian/Soviet military engagements between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, examine Russia’s current domestic military production and exports, and probe the foreign relations of the Russian Federation for sources of both diplomatic support and military or dual-use import and export markets. We conclude that the Russian mobilization for war has peaked (except the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly tactical nuclear weapons). In contrast, the Western coalition in support of Ukraine has barely started fighting. This is the chief Russian vulnerability and the most significant Western advantage. The report concludes with policy recommendations for Western decision-makers and other leaders as to how to exploit these vulnerabilities, win the war in Ukraine, and thus secure the peace not only in Europe but also in other “at risk” regions of the world by restoring deterrence.
Voice of Ukraine 