Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought it a new set of partners. While this group is sometimes referred to as an axis, in reality it is a set of intensifying bilateral ties with countries—China, Iran and North Korea—that are essential for Russia’s continued prosecution of the war. The presence of these countries’ leaders at the military parade in Beijing to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia—and their fulsome commitment to a new world order that the United States no longer dominates—suggests that these countries increasingly constitute an anti-US bloc, united not by shared values but by shared grievances.
These three authoritarian states are essential allies not only in the war on Ukraine, but also in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan for a “post-West” global order. In Putin’s vision, this would be a multipolar world in which the United States has lost its “hegemonic” role and is only one of several great powers setting the global agenda. As Putin noted at the 2024 Valdai International Discussion Club, “What is at stake is the West’s monopoly, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was held temporarily at the end of the twentieth century. But let me reiterate, as those gathered here understand: any monopoly, as history teaches us, eventually comes to an end.”
What is the nature of Russia’s relationship with these three revisionist powers? To what extent do they coordinate their policies? How durable are these new sets of relationships and how might they evolve once the war is over? This report will address these questions and suggest how the West might deal with “the CRINK”—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—collectively and individually going forward.
For centuries, Russia’s ties with China were complex and often adversarial, culminating in armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 (the latest in a series of skirmishes that occurred over the centuries). The original Russian mission to China was established in Beijing in 1658, and the two countries’ ties fluctuated between cooperation and conflict for the next three hundred years. The Russian empire in the mid-nineteenth century annexed what is now the Russian Far East from China, building up the city of Vladivostok, which in Russian means “ruler of the East.” Joseph Stalin did not welcome Mao Zedong’s victory in the Chinese Civil War and, after Stalin’s death, relations deteriorated rapidly, culminating in the 1969 border clashes. Relations began to improve under Mikhail Gorbachev, even though the Chinese were appalled by the collapse of the USSR and the end of Soviet communism. Throughout the centuries, it was clear that Russia and China were not natural partners; Russians consider themselves culturally to be Europeans, not Asians.
In 2022, Putin closed Russia’s window on Europe. Before the invasion of Ukraine, he had prioritized improving ties with China, but since 2022 he has made an unprecedented turn to Asia, courting a larger group of countries. In his quarter century in the Kremlin (with a technical hiatus from 2008–2012 when Dmitry Medvedev nominally led Russia), Putin has courted China, especially after Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. Xi’s first foreign trip was to Russia and the two leaders have met more than forty times since then. They appear to enjoy close personal ties, even if one discounts some of the hyperbole they use when praising each other. Both are autocratic leaders, ideologically aligned and allergic to Western criticisms of their democratic deficits. Neither publicly criticizes the other’s domestic politics. Both publicly favor a multipolar world in which the United States is much diminished and retreats from their respective neighborhoods. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner since 2009, and their bilateral trade has doubled since 2020. The economic relationship is much more important for Russia than for China, but China is a top purchaser of Russian hydrocarbons. Since the start of the war in Ukraine and the imposition of Western energy sanctions against Russia, China has benefited from importing cheap Russian oil.
Voice of Ukraine 